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Antitrust Aspects of U.S.-Japanese Trade
by Wilbur L. Fugate*
I.

INTRODUCTION

n recent years, controversy has intruded upon the historically open
and amicable U.S.-Japan trade relationship. Japanese trade practices
have been blamed by many sectors in the United States for the growth of
the U.S. $20 billion annual trade deficit with the Japanese (out of a total
annual trade volume of nearly $60 billion). Foremost among the complaints, according to U.S. Trade Representative William E. Brock, is the
alleged existence of a coordinated strategic industries policy by the Japanese which uses "legally sanctioned cartels designed . . . to restrain

competition." 1
As a result of this and analogous allegations, legislative attempts to
protect favored industries from "unfair" competition have occurred in
both the United States and Japan. The House of Representatives in the
last Congress passed a "domestic content" bill to increase the percentage
of American made parts in Japanese automobiles sold in the United
States. 2 Similarly, the Japanese maintain strict quotas against the importation of certain agricultural products to protect their small yet valued
agricultural industry.
Both countries' actions underscore a deviation from the spirit of the
1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States and Japan. s This treaty granted Japan Most Favored Nation status vis-h-vis bilateral trade, and both countries agreed "to consult
with respect to any [unfair business] practices and to take such measures
* Of counsel, Baker & Hostetler, Washington, D.C.; former Chief, Foreign Commerce

Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice and member of U.S. Delegation to OECD Restrictive Business Practices Committee; author of FORIGN COMMERCE
AM THE ANTrrRusT LAws (3d ed. 1982).

Address of William E. Brock before the Electronics Industry Association of Japan
(June 9, 1982).
2 Auerbach, U.S.-Japan Trade Not Expected to Improve This Year, Washington Post,
Jan. 22, 1983, at D10, col. 5; Auerbach and Brown, Domestic-Content Bill Takes Aim at
Japan, Washington Post, Dec. 9, 1982, at D12, col. 1.
3 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Japan, Oct. 30, 1953, Art.
XVIII(1), 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863; 206 U.N.T.S. 143.
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a view to eliminating such harmful effects.""

The theme of this article is to illustrate the effect of U.S. and Japanese antitrust laws and related import trade laws on bilateral trade. Measures taken and under consideration by the United States in response to
the perceived threat of unfair competition by major Japanese industries
and the Japanese government will be emphasized. Japanese antitrust laws
will be examined in the context of a generally contrary policy by the Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI). An attempt will also be
made to examine the nature and extent of the "unfairness" that exists in
U.S.-Japanese trade relations.
II. EXPORT TRADE: THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND POLICIES OF THE

UNITED

STATES AND JAPAN

Both the United States and Japan have laws which exempt exports
from their respective antitrust laws. The United States, since 1918, has
provided a limited exemption from its antitrust laws for combinations of
U.S. exporters. The Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act (Webb Act),5
which is still in effect despite subsequent export legislation, is administered by the Federal Trade Commission. It exempts from the Sherman
Act associations formed for the sole purpose of export trade in goods,
provided that activities of such associations do not substantially restrain
trade within the United States, restrain the trade of a competing exporter, '"artificially or intentionally" enhance or depress U.S. prices or result in 6consumption or resale of the exported commodity in the United
States.
In 1982, Congress also enacted the Export Trading Company Act
(Trading Company Act)7 which created an Office of Export Trade in the
Commerce Department,8 expanded the export exemption and included
the export of services in addition to permitting bank holding companies
to engage in export trade through export trading companies. The Trading
Company Act provides for an "export trade certificate of review" to be
issued by the Secretary of Commerce, 9 who administers the law after conId.
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981).
4

a Id. § 62.
7 Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982). See CorN. REP. on S. 734, H.R. REP. No. 924,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, reprinted in 43 ANrmusT &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 719 (Oct. 7, 1982). See also Fugate, The Antitrust Exemption for
Export Trade: The Old Webb-Pomerene Act and the New Export Trading Company Act,
15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 673 (1983).
8 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 104, 96 Stat. 1233, 1235.
9 1d. § 301, 96 Stat. at 1240.
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curring approval by the Attorney General. 10 Such a certificate affords an
exemption from the antitrust laws for criminal penalties and from the
trebling of damages for activities resulting in civil liability for antitrust
violations. 12 An export certificate of review may only be issued if the applicant's proposed conduct does not violate the Webb Act. 2 Another criteria, not in the Webb Act, requires that the activities do not constitute
unfair methods of competition against competing exporters. 13 Proposed
regulations under the Trading Company Act 4 recite that the purpose of
this legislation is "to increase United States exports of products and services by encouraging more efficient provision of export trade services."5
The antitrust provisions were enacted in response to criticism that export
activities were not sufficiently protected from unfair competition under
the Sherman Act.'
In Japan, both export and import cartels are exempted from the Antimonopoly Law by the Export and Import Trading Act. 17 The import
provisions of this act will be considered in a subsequent part of this article.' 8 Export agreements are permitted for specific commodities. Japanese
exporters may enter into agreements among themselves on "price, quantity, quality, design or any other matter in domestic transactions relating
to commodities of a particular kind to be exported to a specific destination,"' 9 and they also may enter into like agreements with producers or
sellers of such commodities. 20 Such agreements, however, must be noted
to the Minister of International Trade and Industry, who must authorize
or refuse to approve within 20 days.2 ' Japanese producers and sellers also
may enter into similar agreements in domestic transactions which are related to commodities of a particular kind to be exported to a specific des10 Id.

§ 303, 96 Stat at 1241.
1 Id. § 306, 96 Stat. at 1243.
12 Id.
13Id.
"4 International Trade Administration, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,972 (1982) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. pt. 325).

18 Id.

No. 637, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. Part 2 (1982); HousE JUDICIARY COMM., REH.R. 1799, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1982, at 9.
17 Act No. 299, Aug. 5, 1952 reprinted in H. IYORI & A. UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY
LAWS OF JAPAN 318 (1983), and in IV Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Business Practices, Japan (1976 with supps.)
[hereinafter cited as IV OECD Guide]. See generally Uesugi, JapaneseAntimonopoly Policy-Its Past and Future, 50 ANTrrRUST L.J. 709 (1981); Matsushita, Export Controls and
Export Cartels in Japan, 20 HARv. INT'L L.J. 103 (1975).
" See infra notes 66-124 and accompanying text.
19 IV OECD Guide, supra note 17, § 5-3.
10H.R. REP.

PORT ON

20

Id.

21

Id. § 5-2(3).
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tination by obtaining the authorization of this Minister.2 2
Unlike U.S. law, the Japanese export exemption does not appear to
be concerned with the anticompetitive repercussions on the domestic
market that agreements between exporters or between producers or sellers of commodities to be exported might have. Another major difference,
at least in the view of U.S. business as indicated by the comments cited in
the Introduction, is that the Japanese Antimonopoly Law not only exempts exports, but the government agency, MITI, is itself very much involved in, and perhaps even directs, the cooperative activities of Japanese
industry to penetrate foreign markets. It should be noted, however, that
some degree of governmental involvement may now be perceived in the
U.S. government inasmuch as the Trading Company Act is administered
by the Commerce Department rather than an antitrust agency.
III.
A.

THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND POLICIES APPLICABLE TO IMPORT TRADE

U.S. Antitrust Laws and United States Import Trade
1. U.S. Antitrust Enforcement as Applied to Import Trade

In both the United States and Japan, antitrust considerations affect
the impact of import trade on each country's domestic market. In both
countries, imports furnish an independent source of competition to domestic industries. Classic international cartel cases in the United States,
such as territorial divisions and allocation of national markets, have been
held to violate the Sherman Act. 23 One aspect of the illegality in these
cases is that such cartels eliminate the competition of imports into the
United States.
In Timken Bearing Co. v. United States,24 a U,S. company agreed
with British and French companies that each would refer orders to the
other when such orders originated in the other company's "territory."
This was held to be a violation of the Sherman Act. The district court in
United States v. National Lead Co. 2' stated that under that cartel "[n]o
[foreign] titanium pigments enter the United States except with the consent of NL" (National Lead Company, a United States company).2" In
recent case of United States v. Addison-Wesley Publishing
the 2more
Co., 7 settled by consent decree, major U.S. and British publishing companies were alleged to have agreed that whenever a copyrighted book
published by one of the British companies was to be published in the
22 Id.

§ 5-3.

23 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1976 & Supp. IV, 1981).

24 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
25 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), mod. & afl'd., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
26 63 F. Supp. 513, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
27 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)

61,225 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (consent decree).
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United States the British company would license a U.S. company to publish it and would not itself sell the book in the United States. A reciprocal
covenant required U.S. companies to license British companies to publish
books in Great Britain.
The United States has a special antitrust statute applicable to import trade in the antitrust provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act (Wilson
Act). 28 Section 73 of that act prohibits "every combination, conspiracy,
trust, agreement or contract" between two or more persons or corporations, either of whom as agent or principal, is engaged in importing any
article into the United States from any foreign country when intended to
operate "in restraint of lawful trade, or free competition in lawful trade
or commerce, or to increase the market price in any part of the United
States" of any article imported or intended to be imported, "or of any
manufacture into which such imported article enters or is intended to
enter."2 In United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information
Center, Inc.30 the court held illegal under the Wilson Act, as well as
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, agreements placing restrictions on
the U.S. import of watches, watch parts and watchmaking machinery.
The defendant companies had agreed not to sell certain types of watchmaking machines to U.S. manufacturers.
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co.31 dealt with arrangements whereby
a U.S. company, Singer Manufacturing Company, conspired with two European companies, all having patents on zig-zag sewing machines, to keep
Japanese imports of such machines out of the U.S. market. The Supreme
Court affirmed the illegality of this arrangement, even though it was argued that the decisions would injure the Singer Company as the sole remaining domestic producer of zig-zag sewing machines for household
32
use.
The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
have uniformly attacked arrangements which place restrictions upon imports, and this has enabled foreign producers to import their goods and
sell them freely in the American market. As one head of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice stated, "our antitrust enforcement
seeks to provide free access to the American market as well as free marketability of American goods abroad." 3
28

15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1976).

29

Id. § 8.

30 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH)

70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH)

71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
31 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
22 Id. at 196.
Address by R. McLaren at William and Mary College, Williamsburg, Va., (Oct. 16,
1970) (discussing competition in foreign commerce of the United States), noted in W. FuGATE, FOREIGN COhMIERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 320 (3d ed. 1982).
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The U.S. antitrust laws are also applicable to foreign manufacturers
and exporters who attempt to monopolize or restrain U.S. trade. Thus, in
one case, it was held that a complaint, which charged a Polish company
with violating the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act by monopolizing the U.S. golf cart market through its U.S. imports, stated a cause of
action. 3 4 Another complaint, alleging that foreign distillers had conspired
to monopolize the U.S. market for scotch whisky through imports, was
also upheld.3 5 A complaint which was settled by consent decree3" alleged
that the DeBeers Diamond Syndicate divided up the U.S. market in the
sale of diamonds by limiting such sales to exclusive distributors in the
United States. The early United States v.Sisal Sales Corp. case3 7 condemned activities to control foreign supply with the object of controlling
U.S. imports, even though the scheme was implemented by foreign legislation. A forerunner of this case was an opinion by Attorney General
Wickersham alleging that a German potash syndicate which fixed prices
for imports into the U.S. market was illegal."' This was the Attorney General's view, even though the arrangement was pursuant to German law.39
The Sisal case and the Wickersham Opinion have a possible current analogy in the Houdaille Industries petition 0 discussed infra.41
The U.S. Department of Justice has also taken the same tack on enforcement as to Japanese or other foreign export associations. The Department of Justice, in United States v. R.P. Oldham4 2 (the Japanese
Wire Nails case), brought suit under both Section 1 of the Sherman Act
and Section 73 of the Wilson Act attacking an arrangement, between Japanese manufacturers or trading companies and U.S. importers, whereby
resale prices were fixed and markets were allocated in the United States.
While during one period the Department of Justice adopted a policy of
forbearance as to combinations of foreign exporters similar to associations
pursuant to the Webb Act 3 this policy was short-lived, and the present
3,Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
" United States v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1168,664 (S.D.N.Y.
1966)(consent decree).
United States v. De~eeft In
tttal"i)]itond Division Ltd., 1976-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) %60,825 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(cohsent decree).
- 274 U.S. 268 (1926).
Opinion re Potash Mines in Germany, 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 545, 553 (1910).
39 Id.
40 Houdaille Industries, Inc., Petition to the President through the Office of the United
States Trade Representative for the Exercise of Presidential Discretion Authorized by the
Revenue Act of 1971 § 103, 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D) (1982) [hereinafter cited as Houdaille
Petition].
"4 See infra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.
42 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
43 Letter from Assistant Attorhey General -D6nald I. Baker to Senator Edward Kennedy, 274 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 15, 16-(1977).
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policy is to treat such export associations 44the same as any other group
which is in violation of the antitrust laws.
The Department of Justice is currently conducting a civil investigation of the marketing practices of six Japanese semiconductor manufacturers for possible price fixing in the U.S. computer chip market (64K
RAMs). 4 5 Civil Investigative Demands have been served on the U.S. subsidiaries of the Toshiba, Nippon Electric, Fujitsu, Hitachi, Old Electric
and Mitsubishi companies.4 6 The Department of Justice has reportedly
asked for, inter alia, all documents relating to the U.S. prices of 64K
RAMs made in Japan and all documents relating to communications or
agreements among the Japanese manufacturers of products shipped to
and sold in the United States. 47 The purpose of the investigation reportedly is to determine if price fixing, supply restrictions or other restraints
of trade existed from December 1981 to July 1982.48 The investigation
apparently became public in Japan as a result of the arrangement, referred to earlier, between the two countries to notify each other of antitrust investigations.
2. Antitrust
U.S. Imports

Aspects

of

Voluntary

Agreements

to

Curtail

In 1969, the U.S. State Dprtmerit, on behalf of the U.S. steel industry, arranged for the steel producers of Europe and Japan to voluntarily restrain their exports of steel to the United States. A U.S. district
court in Consumer Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers not only held that the
President of the United States had no authority to exempt such agreements from the antitrust laws, but also stated that such agreements, so
far as foreign producers were concerned, were illegal under the antitrust
laws.4 9 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the holding on the lack of
presidential power, but vacated the antitrust dictum of the lower court.50
Congress, in the Trade Agreements Act of 1974, gave the President power
" Remarks of Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter Before ABA Section of
International Law, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 29, 1981), reprinted in 1034 ANTrrRusT &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-18 (Oct. 8, 1981).
45Lohr, Six Japan ConcernsFocus of Inquiry, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1982, at Al, col. 1;
Wall St. J., July 27, 1982, at 4, col. 2; Bus. Wx., Aug. 9, 1982, at 22, col. 1.
48 N.Y. Times, supra note 45, at D13.
47 Id.
48 Id.

49Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973). Note,
however, that the court does recognize that the President may enter into agreements or
diplomatic arrangements with private foreign steel concerns so long as such agreements are
not violative of legislation regulating foreign commerce, for example the Sherman Act.
50Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
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to execute voluntary steel agreements prior to January 1, 1975.51
The governments of the United States and Japan have had a "voluntary agreement" since 1981 that Japan will restrict its export of
automobiles to the United States for two years. 52 This government-togovernment agreement was negotiated to avoid the antitrust risks which
prior industry agreements have encountered. As a result of the negotia53
tions, Japan imposed mandatory quotas on its automobile companies.
Attorney General William French Smith, in commenting on the U.S.Japanese automobile agreement, 4 emphasized the antitrust danger of private industry agreements. The Attorney General made the suggestion,
which was later implemented, that the Japanese government should require the precise curtailment of exports by Japanese manufacturers, particularly in order to avoid antitrust suits.
General Motors Corporation, in connection with its proposed joint
venture with Japanese Toyota Motor Company to build small cars, has
requested a special quota of 300,000 small cars to be built in Japan by
Toyota."5 Both Ford Motor Company and Chrysler Corporation have
taken the position that, if the joint venture goes through, they also will
have to bring in Japanese small cars to meet the competition of G.M.Toyota and that the result may be to transfer most small-car production
5
overseas. 6
B.

Japanese Antitrust Laws and Japanese Import Trade

The Japanese antitrust law and policy does not directly address the
question of providing foreign goods free access to the Japanese market
but rather is concerned with imports and international agreements. Further, the Japanese Export and Import Trading Act is concerned with expediting imports. Persons engaged in business in Japan are prohibited
from entering into any international contract which contains arrangements constituting unreasonable restraint of trade or unfair business
"' 19 U.S.C. § 2485 (1976).
5

DeKeiffer, Antitrust and the JapaneseAuto Quotas, 50 ANTIUST L.J. 779 (1981).

" Auerbach, U.S.-Japan Trade Not Expected to Improve this Year, Washington Post,
Jan. 22, 1983, at D9, col. 5; Auerbach, Brock Favors Longer Curb on JapaneseAutos, Wash-

ington Post, Oct. 10, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
" 1007 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-9 (Mar. 26, 1981).
55 Brown, Ford Says GM Venture a Threat, Washington Post, Sept. 2, 1983, at F1, col.

2. The joint venture has been approved by the Federal Trade Commission, 3 to 2 (Isikoff,
FTC Approves GM-Toyota Plan, Washington Post, Dec. 23, 1983, at B8, col. 6). However,

Chrysler has sued to enjoin the arrangement, which suit is opposed by the Department of
Justice (Isikoff, Justice Questions Chrysler Filing of Autoplant Suit, Washington Post,
Feb. 7, 1984, col. 3).
54 Id.
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practices. 57 Such contracts must be reported to the Japanese Fair Trade
Commission, the Japanese antitrust authority, within thirty days58
The Japanese Antimonopoly Law, as applied to the Japanese market,
forbids private monopolization, e.g. controlling other enterprises, thus
causing a substantial restraint of competition and an unreasonable restraint of trade as well as unfair business practices. 59 "Unreasonable restraint of trade" generally encompasses horizontal arrangements to fix
prices or limit production, technology, products, facilities, customers or
suppliers causing a substantial restraint of competition in any particular
area."0 The term "unfair business practices" includes the following among
numerous practices: concerted refusal to deal, unreasonable refusal to
deal by a dominant company, boycotts, discriminatory business prices or
terms, unreasonably high or low prices, unreasonable exclusive dealing
and restrictive vertical arrangements. 61 The antitrust laws also provide
for measures against monopolistic situations (e.g., where one enterprise
has over 50 percent of the market or the two largest have over 75
62
percent).
The Antimonopoly Law has specific exceptions for various types of
cartels. Thus, a "rationalization cartel" may be approved for manufacturers if it will result in the advancement of technology, improvement of
quality of goods, reduction in cost or increase efficiency.6 3 The general
idea of rationalization is to divide up production of various lines of products so that only one or two companies will produce a particular line. In
Japan such cartels are permissible where consumer interests are not injured and the production of a particular product is not unduly concentrated in the hands of any one firm.' "Depression cartels" are permitted
for manufacturers when the price of a product is below the cost of production, some manufacturers might be forced out of business, and these
circumstances cannot be overcome by rationalization of an individual enterprise.65 Since only Japanese manufacturers may join such cartels, a
cartel's effect would seem to make it more difficult for importers of for'1

IV OECD Guide, supra note 17, § 6 at 7-8.

5s Id.

59 Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade,
Law No. 54 of 1947 amended by Law No. 63 of 1977, as amended July 23, 1982, reprintedin
IV OECD Guide, supra note 17, §§ 3, 19, and in H. Iyoi & A. UESUGI, supra note 17, at
213; see generally M. Matsushita, The Revised Monopoly Law of Japan, 1979 (paper given
at United States-Japan Law Conf., Washington, D.C.); Ariga & Rieke, The Antimonopoly
Law of Japan, 39 WASH. L. REv. 437 (1964).
60 IV OECD Guide, supra note 17, § 2(6) at 5.
61 Id., § 2(9) at 6, 19, § 2(19) at 1.
62 Id. § 1(7) at 5-6, 10-11.
s Id. § 24(4) at 23-24.
Id. § 24-4 at 24.
65 Id. § 24-3 at 22-23.
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eign products.

IV. UNITED

STATES AND JAPANESE IMPORT TRADE LAWS

Apart from the antitrust laws, both the United States and Japan
have trade laws which regulate imports with the avowed object of
preventing "unfair" practices in import trade. When confined to this purpose, such laws are similar to the antitrust laws. In the United States
some of these laws adopt the general phraseology of the antitrust laws. In
practice, however, these trade laws may be protectionist in effect; if particular imports injure a domestic industry, pressure to keep out such imports regardless of the fairness or unfairness of the competition will be
applied.
Trade laws that act to prevent unfair imports are recognized and allowed under the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),66 under whose auspices multinational negotiations were last held
in the "Tokyo Round" in 1979.17 National antidumping duties, for example, are permitted under GATT rules where there are sales to a foreign
country: (a) at a price lower than the seller charges in his home market;
or (b) if there are no domestic sales, either at a price lower than the highest price for a like product sold to third countries, or lower than the cost
of production plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit. 8 Such
dumping must cause or threaten national injury to a domestic industry or
materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry. 9
A.

70
United States Import Trade Laws

1.

Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws

The Antidumping Act of 1921 was repealed and replaced by provisions of the Trade Act of 1979.71 Under the two-part procedure of this
Antidumping Act, the Secretary of Commerce must first determine
whether imported goods are being sold in the United States at less than
their fair value (LTFV), and, if such an affirmative finding is made, then
the International Trade Commission (ITC) must determine whether a
" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5 & 6, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
67 AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).

" GATT, supra note 66, at art. VI.
e9 Id.
70 W. FUGATE, supra note 33, at 271; Applebaum, Antitrust Aspects of Trade Law
Cases, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 759 (1981).
71 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1970) repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (1979 & Supp. IV 1981)).
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U.S. industry is materially injured or threatened with such injury, or is
materially retarded.7 2 A former head of the Antitrust Division characterized a violation of the U.S. antidumping law as "in substance an antitrust
offense, while the remedy provided is through tariff machinery normally
applied as an adjunct of trade policy."7'
Since 1970, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have filed a number of briefs with the ITC calling attention to
competitive aspects which, in their view, should be taken into consideration by the ITC in antidumping cases. One of the first important cases in
which the Department of Justice filed a brief was an antidumping proceeding relating to large power transformers from Japan and other countries.74 There, the Department of Justice stated its view that a higher
level of market penetration by imports in the U.S. market should be required to impose antidumping relief "in an industry dominated by a few
firms with very large market shares than for more competitive
75
industries.
In the past, enforcement of the antidumping laws by the Commerce
Department had caused it to establish a "trigger point" mechanism for
steel imports, as linked to steel prices in Japan. If an importer's customs
declaration for a particular steel product was lower than that of Japan,
considered the most efficient national steel producer, a presumption of
dumping existed and an antidumping investigation would be initiated.76
The mechanism was suspended in January 1982 when the U.S. steel industry fied the antidumping and countervailing duty petitions referred
to infra.7 While the Department of Commerce used this trigger point, it
was pointed out by one commentator that the steel industry had a large
input into the level of such a "trigger point" and that antitrust questions
were inherent in the system.78 Antitrust questions have been raised about
settlements of antidumping proceedings by voluntary agreement under
which importers agreed to the price of the imported products.7 9 Such setId.
Letter from Assistant Attorney General R. McLaren to Treasury Department (June
14, 1971) (concerning changes in Treasury Regulations), noted in W. FUGATE, supra note 33,
72

73

at 267.

74 Large Power Transformers from Italy, Japan, Switzerland and the United Kingdom,
37 Fed. Reg. 1509 (1972); 37 Fed. Reg. 3136 (1972).
75 Id.
76 See

generally Mundheim, Developments in Antidumping Law, 34 Bus. LAw 1831

(1979).
" See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
7
"See
generally Applebaum, Antitrust Aspects of Trade Law Cases,50
759 (1981).

ANTITRUST

L.J.

79 Address by D. Rosenthal before the Practising Law Institute, Washington, D.C.
(Nov. 9, 1979) (discussing Antitrust Risks in Abusing Import Relief Laws) noted in W. Fu-

GATE,

supra note 33, at 266.
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tlements are provided for in the law under "extraordinary circumstances," 80 but the Justice Department has warned of collusion by any
such settlements."1
In 1982 U.S. steel companies filed over 100 antidumping and countervailing duty petitions. In a major ruling, the ITC held that imports of
government-subsidized steel from six European nations, constituting
about 11% of imported steel, had injured the U.S. steel industry. 2 Subsequently, the United States and European Communities agreed to a threeyear steel accord covering eleven carbon steel products and alloys and
restricting European imports to about 5.12% of the total U.S. steel market.8" There is also a 5.9% ceiling on European pipe and tube steel used
in oil drilling. As a result of the accord, most of the antidumping suits
were terminated.
The United States also has a Countervailing Duty law which provides
that, when a foreign exporter is aided by a subsidy from his government
in importing goods to the United States and the exporter is injuring U.S.
producers, a duty may be levied on such goods equal to the subsidy. "'
2.

Escape Clause Actions

"Escape Clause" actions are those brought before the ITC under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.5 The "escape clause" is an exception
from the usual GATT rules.8 8 Under this procedure, a U.S. industry may
petition the ITC by alleging that imports are a substantial cause of serious injury to that industry. No unfair practices need be alleged. The ITC
may make a determination of such injury if it finds that imports are increasing, that a domestic industry has suffered or is threatened by serious
injury and that imports are a substantial cause of serious injury no less
than any other cause. If it concludes that injury has been proved, the ITC
recommends import relief to the President who can then impose quotas,
increase duties, or negotiate orderly marketing agreements with foreign
87
governments.
A much publicized escape clause petition was brought by the United
80 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)(A) & (B).
81 Rosenthal, supra note 79.
81ITC Rules for U.S. on Steel, Washington Post, Oct. 16, 1982, at 1, col. 1. See also
Certain Steel Products from Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Romania, United Kingdom and West Germany, USITC PuB. 1221 (1982).
" Accord is Reached with Europeans on Steel Exports, Washington Post, Oct. 22,
1982, at 1, col. 5.
84 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(a) (1976).
81 Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976). See 19 C.F.R. § 2067 (1979).
88 GATT, supra note 66.
87

Id. § 201.
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Auto Workers and Ford Motor Company, alleging that the U.S. automobile industry had been injured by Japanese auto imports.88 While the ITC
did find injury from increased Japanese imports, it concluded that Japanese imports were not the primary cause of the U.S. auto industry's

injury.

8
9

3.

Section 337 of the Tariff Act

Section 337 of the Tariff Act 0 makes "unfair methods of competition
and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States" unlawful when the effect or tendency of a method or act is to destroy or
substantially injure a U.S. industry that is "efficiently and economically
operated," or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or "to
restrain or monopolize trade or commerce in the United States." 91 The
administration of this law is the responsibility of the ITC which, if it
finds such unfair importation, may order the exclusion of such articles or
issue a cease and desist order.9 2 Prior to the Tariff Act's amendment in
1974'3 it was mainly used to curb the importation of articles which infringed upon a U.S. patent." The 1974 Trade Act expanded its coverage
and added authority for the ITC to issue a cease and desist order. When
the Commission makes a determination of injury, this goes to the President who has 60 days to disapprove such determination "for .policy
95
reasons."
Since 1974 the ITC has had several cases before it involving alleged
unfair trade practices by Japanese companies in the importation of Japanese products.98 The Department of Justice has suggested that the ITC
use great caution in excluding foreign products because of its chilling effect on the competition of importers.9 The Department of Justice filed a
brief in the ITC case of Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube from Ja" Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chasis and Bodies Therefor, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,194
(1980).
89 Id.

- 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)-(j) (1976).
1 Id. See generally Alberger, Critical Issues in InternationalAntitrust and Unfair
Competition Law, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 771 (1981).
92 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (e) & (f).
" Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. 3, § 341(a), 88 Stat. 2053 (1975).
" W. FUGATE, supra note 33, at 268-271.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1976).
See, e.g., Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, Inc., 41 Fed. Reg. 50,357 (1976)
(terminated by consent orders, Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe & Tube, 43 Fed. Reg.
17,789 (1978)).
" See generally Rosenthal & Sheldon, § 337: A View within the Department of Justice, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoiP. L. 47 (1979). See also Musrey, Tariff Act's Section 337: Vehicle.
for the Protection and Extension of Monopolies, 5 LAw & POL. iN INT'L Bus. 56 (1973).
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pan," arguing against ITC sanction as relief against antitrust type claims
in that case (unreasonably low pricing with intent to destroy a competitor).99 Section 337 particularly illustrates the fine line between the antitrust laws and import trade laws. While the language is certainly antitrust
language, the ITC is not usually in the role of enforcing the antitrust
laws.
4.

Other Import Actions

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Trade Act
of 1976, authorizes the President, inter alia, to take appropriate steps to
eliminate any act, policy or practice of a foreign country which "is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United
States commerce."1"" Under this authority, the President may suspend or
withdraw from a trade agreement or impose duties or import
restrictions. 0 1
An interesting petition for import relief relying on antitrust considerations was filed under a similar provision of the Internal Revenue Code
by Houdaille Industries in May 1982.102 The allegations are described in
some detail since they are similar to U.S. business complaints in other
industries that the Japanese government has combined with Japanese industry to "target" particular markets in foreign countries. This petition
sought to invoke Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971, which authorizes
the President to suspend investment tax credits granted to importers of
foreign goods if he determines that U.S. commerce has been unjustifiably
restricted by non-tariff trade barriers or if a foreign country engages in
"discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance of international cartels)
1 03
or policies unjustifiably restricting United States commerce."
The Houdaille petition asked that the President suspend investment
tax credits for specific Japanese-made machine tools, namely "NC
machining centers" and "NC punching machines." The petition alleged
that a Japanese machine tool cartel had taken nearly 50% of the U.S.
market away from American manufacturers in the first case and nearly
40% in the latter. Furthermore the petition maintained that the U.S.
market share of the Japanese cartel members for machining centers increased from 3.7% in 1976 to 50.1% in 1982, and the Japanese share of
the U.S. market for punching machines jumped from 4.7% to 37.6% in
98 Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe & Tube, supra note 96.
9 Id.

19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B) (1976).
01Id. § 2411(b) (1976).
102 Houdaille Petition, supra note 40.
103 Revenue Act of 1971, § 103, 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D) (1982).
100
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the same period."0 4
According to the complaint, the machine tool cartel was formed in
response to three successive Japanese special laws for the promotion of
the machine tool industry. While labelled "temporary," such laws have
remained in effect since 1956. The rationalization of this industry was
allegedly carried out by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade
(MITI). Each firm whose production of a particular machine tool was less
than 5% of the Japanese market in that tool and less than 20% of the
company's total production was directed to stop making these tools. Such
market share was allocated to a limited number of more successful manufacturers. The petition further stated that, under MITI's guidance, these
companies then exploited the consequent economies of scale and specialization to penetrate foreign markets, particularly the U.S. market, "secure
in the knowledge that these advantages would be protected against competitive erosion in the Japanese market."1"5
Joint activities of such companies in or affecting the U.S. market
were alleged, including price fixing on exports to the United States and
notification by each company to the others of an intention to produce
new machine tools with consultation on such production. It was said that
the price fixing was "formally immunized" under Japan's Antimonopoly
Law and that MITI had also accorded it informal immunity for other
joint activities.108
The antitrust complaint was the main focus of the petition, but it
was also alleged that the Japanese government aided and subsidized its
export industries, including the machine tool industry by giving them valuable licenses to import raw sugar to compensate them for losses attributable to dumping in foreign countries. The petition also alleged that proceeds from wagering on bicycle and motorcycle races in Japan were
funnelled into export industries, including the machine tool industry. It
was further charged that for a considerable period of time Japan did not
permit the importation of machine tools for which there were Japanese
equivalents.10 7
The petition stated that relief probably was not available under the
U.S. antitrust laws because of the participation by the Japanese government in the alleged anti-competitive activities and that the sovereign immunity or Act of State doctrines might be involved. Further, while some
of the cartel conduct might be violative of the Japanese Antimonopoly
Law, it was said that the Japanese Fair Trade Commission had indicated
I" Houdaile Petition, supra note 40.
105 Id.

10 Id.
107

Id.
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that it did not intend to pursue the matter. 108
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) had given its
support to the Houdaille petition. 10 9 Moreover, the Senate in an unusual
resolution in December 1982 urged the President to heed the Houdaille
petition and to deny the investment tax credit to the Japanese manufacturers and importers of machine tools.110
Japanese International Trade and Industry Minister Sadanori
Yamanaka denied that Japan's machine-tool exports violate the U.S. antitrust laws. He also stated that the Senate Resolution "will seriously discourage joint efforts of the U.S. and Japanese governments to maintain
the free trading system" and that it "violates the GATT rule and the
Japan-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.""'
The U.S. Trade Administrator, William E. Brock, announced in April
1983 that the petition had been denied" 2 but that he would begin consultations with Japan concerning the alleged practices. He said, "It is important that these discussions effectively deal with these problems, making
further action unnecessary."'1
The Houdaille petition indicates that trade laws are sometimes used
as an alternative to an antitrust suit where there may be jurisdictional or
sovereign immunity questions raised and where the action is likely to be
protracted and expensive. Here, it may be questioned whether the alleged
Japanese cartel is actually an "international" cartel. The gist of the complaint appears to be that a Japanese domestic cartel has received immunity from the Japanese antitrust laws and, because of the rationalization
in the domestic market, has been able to undercut prices in the U.S. market. The NAM was obviously dubious of the antitrust count when it
stated:
The petitioner might as well have said it [the increased U.S. market
share] was achieved as a result of Japanese industrial policy. Presumably
it did not because a foreign industrial policy per se provides no explicit
basis for a petition under U.S. law, but one that involves "tolerance of
international cartels" does."'
108 Id.
108 Lawrence A. Fox, Vice-President for International Economic Affairs, Comments of

the National Association of Manufacturers on the Houdaille Industries Petition (July 30,
1982) [hereinafter cited as NAM Comments].
110 Rowe, Reagan Urged to End Machine Tool Breaks, Washington Post, Dec. 23, 1982,
at C12, col. 5.
111Machine-Tool Move Hit by Trade Aide, Washington Post, Dec. 25, 1982, at D5, col.

6.
112

Press release of U.S. Trade Representative William E. Brock, Apr. 22, 1983.

'1'

Id.

, NAM Comments, supra note 109.
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The antitrust charges, however, might have some merit in themselves
if price fixing or monopolization in the U.S. market were charged. That
appears to be the basis of the Department of Justice investigation of computer chips, discussed supra.115 Even though part of a conspiracy
originates in a foreign country and even though aided by foreign law, a
violation of U.S. law may still occur. This was the holding of both the
Sisal case""' and the Japanese Wire Nails17 complaint. As has been
noted, foreign government sanction for an export association does give it
immunity under U.S. law.
B. Japanese Trade Laws Relating to Unfair Import Practices or
Cartels
Japan has both an antidumping law"" and countervailing duty law.119
Any person may make a request to the government to levy antidumping
or countervailing duties, respectively, by providing the Minister of Finance written information of manufacturer, type, model and features of
the goods, the exporter, exporting country and a summary of the facts
regarding such importation. Evidence must be presented to the Minister
showing material injury to an industry in Japan caused such importation.
The Minister of Finance may then make an investigation of such facts
and evidence, and both the exporter and importer of the goods subject to
investigation, or other party having an interest therein, may present to
the Minister written or oral evidence regarding the importation. If the
Minister decides that action should be taken, he shall refer to the matter
to the Customs Tariff Council, or he may take provisional steps, if urgently necessary, to protect an industry and report this to the Council.12
Contrary to the many antidumping actions in the United States, Japan
has rarely, perhaps only one time recently, used its antidumping or countervailing laws."2 '
Provisions of Japanese law regarding imports are contained in the
Export and Import Trading Act, which was previously referred to regarding exports. 2 2 This act is concerned more with MITI's extensive regula-

",
"-e
11

Supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
United States v. Sisal Sales Co., 274 U.S. 268 (1926).
United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).

118Cabinet
119Cabinet

Order Relating to Antidumping Duty (May 25, 1980).
Order Relating to Countervailing Duty (May 25, 1980).
120 See Cabinet Orders, supra notes 118 and 119.
1I Advice from A. Uesugi, First Secretary of the Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C.
According to Mr. Uesugi, Japan has not invoked this law because it might injure its image
as a country with a free trade policy under GATT. Id.
122 Act No. 299, Aug. 5, 1952, reprinted in IV OECD Guide, supra note 17, pt. Ill-Il
(Agreements Concerning Imports) and in H. IyoRi & A. UasuGI, supra note 17, at 318.
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tion of imports and exports than it is with provisions regarding unfair
practices. Because of such regulation and because up to this time tariffs
and other regulations have served as a substantial brake on imports except for particular commodities, it may be that Japan has not considered
it necessary to invoke its antidumping or countervailing duty laws or to
provide in its laws for other relief from unfair trade practices.
Yet, Japan's Antimonopoly Law is not applicable to price fixing and
other agreements among importers if they are approved by MITI. Importers may, when sufficient cause exists as set out below, "enter into
agreements on price, quantity, quality or other matters in regard to import trade, in commodities of the same or a similar kind... by obtaining
the authorisation of the Minister of International Trade and Industry, or
may . . . enter into an agreement with customers or sellers" with such
authorization if an agreement among themselves will not eliminate such
cause. '
The Antimonopoly Law permits such agreements when disadvantageous import trade conditions for commodities from a particular foreign
country (or domestic trading in such country is substantially restrained or
excessively competitive) exist, when import prices of commodities from a
particular country may be much higher than those of other countries due
to intergovernmental agreement or when continued importations of commodities produced from exploited resources in a foreign country may be
uncertain. 2"
V.

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The above survey of U.S. and Japanese antitrust and trade laws indicates the following effects on U.S.-Japanese trade:
(1) The U.S. antitrust laws and policies are designed to facilitate
imports of foreign goods, including Japanese goods, as well as to prevent
restraint of trade or monopolizaton of that trade by either U.S. or foreign
companies. This policy has been pursued even where U.S. companies are
injured, as was argued in the Singer case. The Japanese antitrust laws do
not appear to be so directed.
(2) The exemption of Japanese export cartels from the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law, together with the exemption of some domestic cartels
aimed at export, appear to have an important bearing on the Japanese
penetration of the U.S. market and the imbalance of U.S.-Japanese trade
in favor of Japan. Contrary to this, the U.S. exemption for export groups
(or cartels) does not appear to be of importance in U.S.-Japanese trade,
both because U.S. firms have been slow to use the exemption and because
123 Id.
124

Id. at 214-15.
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Japan has not opened up its market as has the United States.
(3) The U.S. trade laws against unfair practices in import trade
have only been of importance in recent years. Such laws have a legitimate
basis when they are directed to actual unfair practices, but they have
sometimes been used as a political or regulating device, e.g., the "trigger
point" mechanism for U.S. steel imports.
United States-Japanese trade is of paramount importance, as has
been pointed out, not only to the two countries but also to the world since
they account for one-third of total world production and in several vital
industries they are the world's largest producers. 125 The general trend has
been for both countries to reduce barriers to trade, including non-tariff
barriers, and this was the purpose of the January 1983 talks between
President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone. 1 26 If the two countries
were to reverse this trend, the result would be disastrous for each and for
the rest of the world.
However, measures to eliminate anticompetitive practices and truly
unfair practices should not deter but advance this trade. The U.S. antitrust laws seek to prevent barriers to foreign imports, usually by domestic
interests. On occasion these laws have also been invoked against combinations of foreign exporters. Such rare cases have been based on restraints
of trade.
When we come to trade laws based on unfair practices, U.S. authorities should be careful not to extend such laws beyond their proper scope.
Department of Justice officials have pointed out that foreign competitors
charged with antidumping may be doing nothing more unfair than engaging in vigorous competition. 127 The Department of Justice has taken the
view before the ITC that sometimes the levying of dumping duties would
have an anticompetitive effect." 8
The U.S. Trade Representative, however, has complained of Japanese cartels formed to exploit the U.S. market. 29 The General Counsel of
the Trade Representative's Office has also said that "U.S. exports are disadvantaged all over the world not only by what we regard as unfair practices, but what foreigners have acknowledged to be unfair practices."12 0
He cited price fixing and market division in third countries and also di125

MacEachron, The United States and Japan: The Bilateral Potential, 61 FOREIGN

AFFAIRS 400, 401 (Winter 1982/83).
126 Auerbach, supra note 2; Oberdorfer,

Reagan Firmly with Nakasone on Trade Issues, Washington Post, Jan. 18, 1983, at A10,col. 1.
127 Rosenthal & Sheldon, supra note 97, at 52.
128 E.g., Primary Lead from Australia and Canada, 39 Fed. Reg. 2156 (1974); Northern

Bleached Hardwood Kraft Pulp from Canada, 38 Fed. Reg. 87 (1973); See Applebaum,
supra note 78, at 770.
129 Brock, supra note 1.
180DeKeiffer, supra note 52, at 785.
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rect foreign government subsidies." 1
Japan extensively regulates its export and import companies and also
in some cases rationalizes domestic competition for export purposes. Activities by Japanese companies following MITI directives or approval,
e.g., targeting of certain industrial markets are exempt from the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law. The active role of the Japanese government also
makes such activities difficult to attack under U.S. antitrust law.
The Reagan Administration has developed a legislative package to
improve U.S. industry competitiveness, the stated objective of which is to
"significantly increase the incentives for investment in R & D [research
and development] and for the efficient exploitation of new technologies. ' 132 One important part, as described by Assistant Attorney General
William H. Baxter, would clarify that joint research and development
may not be condemned as per se illegal under the antitrust laws and that
joint ventures which are fully disclosed to the government would be immunized from all private antitrust suits and from government antitrust
damage suits.138 Secretary Baldrige has said that the Reagan Administration is studying possible changes such as allowing the major steel companies to merge and permitting certain industries to pool their research and
development efforts. 13 4 The steel industry presents a special situation. It
is an industry essential to the United States both from industrial and
national defense standpoints. Yet, many of its plants have become outmoded and it has fallen far behind foreign industry, particularly Japan's, in
technology and efficiency. Cooperation between U.S. steel companies in
an effort to revive the industry, with U.S. government help, may be necessary. However, new plants and technology and the cooperation of management and labor to produce more efficiently would appear to be much
more important in reviving this essential industry. As to other industries
pooling their research and development efforts, cooperation in research
and development is already allowed subject to competitive considerations;1 35 however, it may be helpful to clarify the law in this respect.
Japan and other countries often permit under their antitrust laws
some types of rationalization and specialization. This, indeed, is one of
the factors singled out in Japan's successful export effort. U.S. Trade
Representative Brock has referred to this,13s and the Houdaille petition
cites it as a main factor in the penetration of the U.S. machine tool mar131

Id.

'" Statement of Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, June 29, 1983.
133 Id.
131Protectionist Mood Grows at White House, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
135 Dep't of Justice, Research Guide Concerning Joint Ventures (1980), reprinted in
466 (1980); FUGATE, supra note 7, § 11.9.
'3, Brock, supra note 1.
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ket by Japanese companies.13
Rationalization and specialization agreements are usually thought of
as only being necessary in smaller or developing countries and not in
countries with large industries like the United States. 38 In general, such
agreements are those in which members of an industry agree either to
limit the number of products or agree that some companies will produce
one product and some another product. Another type of agreement relates to joint efforts to save overhead or other costs for greater efficiencies, including joint research and development. Perhaps the idea should
be studied in the United States but it does not seem to be appropriate in
a country having'such large size units of production. General Motors can
rationalize its own production, for example by using the same engine in
cars manufactured by different divisions. Companies in difficulty can voluntarily cut down on the number of models they produce. The public
may not demand that a manufacturer produce a dozen models of what is
essentially the same car, and the automobile companies appear to finally
realize this.
United States industry is presently having trouble competing with
Japan. To the extent that this is caused by unfair practices, these should
be eliminated. The best way would seem to be by negotiations by the U.S.
government with the Japanese government, and progress is being made in
that direction. At the same time our industry must be willing to accept
the fair, vigorous competition of Japanese industry. U.S. industry which
has been the most creative, innovative and technologically proficient in
the world has the ability to meet this challenge. The U.S. automobile industry, with management and labor 9 cooperation, is already staging a
comeback against Japanese imports."2
137
13

Houdaille Petition, supra note 40, at 5 (Introduction and Summary).
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